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Edited by Roberto Poli

Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock

Against the Current Selected Philosophical Papers



Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock
Against the Current
Selected Philosophical Papers

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Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Preface p. iii

Acknowledgements p. xii

Introduction p. 7

(I) First Part: On Husserl, Frege, Carnap and Kripke p. 19

1. 'On the Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy' p. 21

2. 'Husserl for Analytic Philosophers' p. 63

3. 'Husserl's Relevance for the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics' p. 91

4. 'The Structure of Husserl's Prolegomena' p. 111

5. 'Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematics: its Origin and Relevance' p. 145

6. 'Husserl's Conception of Physical Theories and Physical Geometry in the Time of the *Prolegomena*: A Comparison with Duhem's and Poincaré's Views' p. 183

7. 'Husserl and Frege on Strict Proper Names and Indexicals' p. 215

8. 'Platonism, Phenomenology and Interderivability' p. 235

9. 'On the Interpretation of the Young Carnap's Philosophy' p. 259

10. 'Necessity *a posteriori* and Contingency *a priori* in Kripke: some Critical Remarks' p. 283

(II) Second Part: Some Heterodox Analytic Philosophy p. 301

11. 'Issues in the Philosophy of Logic: an Heterodox Approach' p. 303

12. 'Husserl on Analyticity and Beyond' p. 325

13. 'Why and How Platonism?' p. 339

14. 'Some Uses of Logic in Rigorous Philosophy' p. 363

15. 'On First- and Second-Order Logic: Ontological Commitment, Logicality and Semantics' p. 383

16. 'On the Semantics of Mathematical Statements' p. 397

17. 'On Necessity and Existence' p. 417

Bibliography p. 423

Subject Index p. 444

Name Index p. 451

Preface

In 2000 I published a collection of some of my papers in a joint book with my friend Claire Ortiz Hill. We had both been working separately mostly on the same issues, namely, Husserl's writings on the philosophy of mathematics, of logic and of language, which had been almost completely ignored and still are by mainstream analytic philosophy. We had been working on such issues independently of each other and independently of J. N. Mohanty for some years – in my case since 1967. Later other scholars, like our friend Jairo da Silva joined the effort. Finally, we had the unforgettable experience of participating in the congress on Phenomenology and Mathematics, organized by Leila Haaparanta, Mirja Hartimo and Juliette Kennedy in Tampere, Finland in 2007, in which distinguished scholars, among them Jaakko Hintikka, Dieter Lohmar and Richard Tieszen - who originally was inclined to a different interpretation of Husserl - shared our general standpoint on Husserl's views.

In the meantime I published an introductory book on Frege's philosophy in 2006, in which I also discussed the similarities and differences between Frege and Husserl, and then a somewhat polemic book on Carnap in 2008. But I consider myself more an author of papers than of books, and I believe that those two very short books could have been better if I had deleted some three to five pages – and in the case of the book on Frege maybe add a critical assessment of the now prevailing Kantian rendering of Frege. The first paper in this collection will take care of that issue.

There were some old papers that I could not include in my joint book with Claire Ortiz Hill, simply because they were not or not primarily either on Husserl or on Frege. Moreover, in the meantime I have written and published extensively, be it on Frege, on Husserl, or simply on the philosophy of logic and mathematics, and it seems pertinent to assemble the papers and publish them together. Since I have many more papers that could be assembled in a single volume – especially considering some extensive critical studies I have published mostly in Spanish, though some in English, as well as commentaries to

writings of other philosophers -, I opted to include in the present collection only papers that are not merely expository, but include either criticism or original renderings of some philosophers, or attempt to offer new solutions to philosophical problems. Thus, this collection of seventeen papers is naturally divided into two parts, the first of which contains ten papers dealing with my renderings of Frege, Carnap and Kripke, but very especially with my rendering of Husserl's views. The second part consists of seven papers dealing with some more original views, though clearly developed in the discussion of those philosophers.

Fourteen of the papers have been published before, mostly in philosophical journals, whereas three of them are published here for the first time, namely, 'On the Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy', 'On the Interpretation of the Young Carnap's Philosophy' and 'On First- and Second-Order Logic: Ontological Commitment, Logicality and Semantics'.

The probably strange title of this book, *Against the Current*, is certainly adequate in many senses. Born and raised in the USA colony of Puerto Rico, not socio-economically privileged and with a medley of races in my blood, it was already against the odds that I would receive a good education, and certainly the school system of my country did not help me very much. As I entered the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras in August 1962, when I still was sixteen years old I did not even know that philosophy was an academic discipline. I had to teach myself most of what I know, though I received some encouragement from many professors at the University of Puerto Rico. Firstly I should mention Prof. Rafael González Torres, who taught me Spanish and Latinamerican literature in my first year, but encouraged me to study philosophy and languages. Then in my second year Prof. Ezequiel González Mas, who taught me a Humanities course – a medley of literature, philosophy, history and art - and Prof. Georges Delacre, my Introduction to Philosophy professor, also encouraged me to study philosophy. At the Philosophy Department I received special encouragement from professors Jorge Enjuto, Ludwig Schajowicz, José R. Echeverría Yáñez and Ángel Jorge Casares, and at the Department of Foreign Languages from my professors Sonia Diaz, David Cruz López, William Sims and Segundo Cardona Bosque. González Torres,

Schajowicz and Sims continued to be interested in my development even after I had finished my doctoral studies in Germany and was already teaching at the Philosophy Department of the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras. And with José R. Echeverría Yáñez and Segundo Cardona Bosque I developed a special friendship and camaraderie that lasted until their respective deaths. To all of them I am very grateful, and would like to dedicate them this book.

I finished my BA in Philosophy in 1966 and my MA in 1968 at the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras, and with funding from the same university I immediately went to Germany, where I studied at the universities of Göttingen and Bonn from 1968 to 1973. It was not easy to adapt to human relations in German universities, especially for a twenty-two years old free thinker so outspoken and so confident in his abilities as I was. In Göttingen I studied with Erhard Scheibe and Günther Patzig, and certainly learned much from both, very especially from the first one, though there was almost no human contact. In Bonn the situation was much different, being then the capital of West Germany and much more liberal than the isolated and conservative Göttingen. In Bonn I studied with Wolfram Schwabhäuser and, very especially with Gottfried Martin and Gisbert Hasenjaeger. I also received special encouragement from Professors Gerhard Funke and Thomas M. Seebohm of the University of Mainz. Though Martin died before I completed my studies, my short experience as his student was very special both from an intellectual and a human standpoint, as was my experience with Hasenjaeger, who ended being my thesis advisor. I obtained my doctorate in June 1973 with a thesis on Husserl's Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics.

I taught at the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras from January 1974 to December 2010. In Puerto Rico, once more I have always had to swim against the current. Most philosophy students seem allergic to logic and rigorous philosophy. Depending on external circumstances, they have been either interested in existentialism, or in Marxism, or more recently in so-called post-modernism, thus, in soft philosophy. Hence, a professor of logic and rigorous philosophy is certainly enemy number one for the average philosophy student. Moreover, there never was much sympathy by some colleagues at the

Humanities Faculty, and especially at the Philosophy Department there were plenty of conspiracies to get rid of me. My first public lecture at the University of Puerto Rico dealt with the unscientific nature of Marxism. From that day on at the end of 1977, though I am a sort of very critical leftist, I have been mostly isolated from leftists in Puerto Rico as if infected with a terrible plague. But as I wrote at the end of my paper on Carnap in this volume: *Amicus Carnap, sed magis amica veritas*. For me justice in general, and especially social justice, has to go hand in hand with rationality.

Interestingly enough, most Marxists - as well as all sorts of post-modern irrationalism - are bedfellows of wild global capitalism, which attempts to dismantle universities and weaken both school and university systems, in order to create a society in which only the very rich would have access to the best education, while trying to limit that of the vast majority of the population to technical proficiency that would serve the interests of the very rich but never question their privileges. Thus there is presently a conscious attack by the state on the Humanities and very especially on rigorous philosophy, which certainly is a source of enlightenment and a potential focus of resistance. Even in Europe, where both school and university systems had been excellent for decades and in some cases for centuries there has been a steady decline of such excellence. It should be pointed out, however, that such a trend, besides being fundamentally unjust, goes against the interests of the same society, since if you restrict the best education to the economically privileged, the probability of educating the best minds for the formal and natural sciences – and for philosophy also – is much smaller than when each and every member of society receives an excellent education that allows him to develop all his capabilities as far as possible.

After such a digression into politics, I want to point out that negative aspects of my teaching experience have been by far compensated by more than a dozen very good students I have had in the last two and a half decades. In fact, from the very beginning I was usually liked by the best students, and the tendency consolidated with the course of time. Some of them have already completed their doctoral studies, mostly, though not exclusively in philosophy, and all have been very grateful and sometimes also helpful and encouraging. And there is

probably no greater pleasure for a genuine professor than to enjoy the success of his former students.

Leaving those personal issues aside, the most clear and relevant manifestation of my tendency to always swim against the current has been my philosophical standpoint. Being somehow in the middle between two schools, analytic philosophy and phenomenology, I cannot be considered as a member of any philosophical tribe. Certainly, I have never consciously applied the phenomenological method of free variation nor have any clear idea of its scope. Husserl was especially careful in its application, but other phenomenologists seem to have gone crazy applying it. Moreover, because of my interest in the philosophy and epistemology of mathematics, I tend to value more Husserl's categorial intuition than Husserl's intuition of (material) essences, two distinct sorts of intuition that most Husserlian scholars do not clearly differentiate. On the other hand, most analytic philosophers since Russell – Frege did not have anything to do with it - consider Ockam's razor as the first commandment of analytic philosophy. Though I am not fond of multiplying entities for pleasure, certainly I am also not fond of ignoring them just to obey that commandment. Hence, whereas, in comparison with Frege, Russell, Quine, Kripke and others have in one way or other tried to reduce the number of entities presupposed in philosophical analysis by eliminating the realm of sense, I have gone in the other direction. I have argued for a semantics that not only acknowledges the existence of senses and truth-values, but also of states of affairs and of what Husserl called 'situations of affairs' (Sachlagen), an extension or modification of which seems to me indispensable in order to adequately analyze the semantics of mathematical statements. Moreover, I have argued – against the empiricist and nominalist current in Angloamerican philosophy - on behalf of mathematical Platonism and of second-order logic, and even have dared to offer a model-theoretic new definition of analyticity. Thus, though methodologically I feel nearer to analytic philosophers than to phenomenologists, in a very important sense I have gone exactly in the direction opposite to mainstream analytic philosophy.

As a Husserlian scholar I belong to a very small group interested in Husserl's contributions to the philosophy of logic and

mathematics, and it has been extremely difficult to convince both traditional phenomenologists and most analytic philosophers of the importance of such contributions. As a Fregean scholar I belong to a minority who consider Frege essentially a philosopher of logic and mathematics, and only derivatively concerned with the philosophy of language and marginally with epistemological issues. Moreover, I consider Frege not only a Platonist, but also a rationalist in the best Leibnizian tradition. Although my rendering of Frege is on these general issues not very different from those of Thiel or Resnik, Schirn or the Dummett of *Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics*, the overwhelming majority of Fregean scholars, especially in the Angloamerican world consider Frege first of all an epistemologist and, moreover, a sort of heir of Kant. Furthermore, as the very recent *The Cambridge Companion to Frege* shows, mainstream scholars usually only refer to each other and opt to ignore scholars not in their very restricted tradition. Thus, even in the bibliography they ignore works by some of the best Fregean scholars, like Thiel and Schirn.

On other more specific issues of Fregean scholarship I am still much more isolated. I am one of the few scholars who consider that Frege basically abandoned the Context Principle in his mature philosophy, first of all, because after the clear distinction between sense, referent and representation there was no need for the Context Principle, and also because it was hardly compatible with his theses on the compositionality of senses and of referents. There is another specific issue of Fregean scholarship in which I am isolated from each and every other Fregean scholar, and I think that the issue is fundamental for the correct interpretation of Frege's writings. I sustain that one should clearly separate, as Frege did in *Begriffsschrift*, the notions of judgeable content (*beurteilbarer Inhalt*) introduced in §2 of that work and that of conceptual content (*Begriffsinhalt*) introduced in §3 of the same work.

The majority of scholars in the Angloamerican world and also in Germany tend to render the young Carnap's most important book, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, as being also under the strong influence of Kant and Neo-Kantianism. Once more, I swim against the current. In chapters 2 and 3 of my book, *The Young Carnap's Unknown Master*, I have not only argued against that rendering but also brought to

the fore very strong similarities between passages of that book and similar passages in some of Husserl's writings. On the basis of that strong evidence, I not only argued that Husserl was by far the most important philosophical influence on the young Carnap but also that the lack of acknowledgement of those similarities put Carnap on the verge of having committed plagiarism. The ninth paper of this book contains additional material against the Neo-Kantian rendering of Carnap and presents my contention in a more sober and less polemical way than in the book.

Of course, there is a very broad sense in which most post-Kantian philosophers are Kantian. If you do not consider that by means of pure reason, without any experience, you can obtain knowledge of the world, and you also do not believe that experience is all there is in knowledge, without any intervention of reason, then you are a Kantian in a very broad sense. In this broad sense, even though I probably would not subscribe any major theoretical thesis of the Aesthetics or the Analytic, I am a Kantian, and I am a Kantian also in a more concrete non-theoretical aspect, namely, with respect to ethics, though I would ground the Categorical Imperative on the basis of a solution of the problem of intersubjectivity in the Descartes-Husserl-the Carnap of the *Aufbau* tradition or, as the young Carnap would put it, 'the constitution of the heteropsychological'. Thus, Frege and Carnap are both in a broad, not especially illuminating sense Kantians, as are also, for example, Husserl, Popper, Lakatos and many others. There are, on the other hand, more specific issues, in which both Carnap and Frege have affinities with Kant. The sage of Königsberg had two clearly different notions of analyticity, namely, (i) that the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, which is the most visible one and seems to presuppose a definite very simple sentential structure, and (ii) that linked to the supreme principle of all analytic judgements, namely, the derivability from the principle of contradiction (charitably rendered as including also the principles of identity and of the excluded middle). Carnap's notion of analyticity is certainly inspired in the former, whereas Frege's notion of analyticity can be seen as an immense improvement of the latter, since from the principle of contradiction (even charitably interpreted) you can derive very little. There are also

clear affinities between Kant and Frege with respect to geometrical knowledge. For both Kant and Frege, geometrical (that is, Euclidean) statements are based on intuition and, thus, are synthetic *a priori*, whereas non-Euclidean statements are, in the best of cases, merely consistent theoretical inventions with no ground in intuition. Frege's arguments, however, on behalf of such a view are clearly distinct from Kant's. Carnap, on the other hand, also argued in his dissertation, *Der Raum*, on behalf of a synthetic *a priori* in geometry. His conception, however, has little to do with Kant's, and seems nearer to Husserl's, since Carnap explicitly rejected the apriorism of two fundamental Kantian theses, namely, the presumed Euclidicity and three-dimensionality of physical space. Nonetheless, leaving aside either general (Frege) or terminological (Carnap) coincidences, it is fundamentally mistaken to render Frege or the young Carnap as Kantian or Neo-Kantian in a strict sense.

As I mentioned above, I consider myself more an author of papers than of books. Thus, when my former student and later colleague Dr. Pierre Baumann and my last assistant, Abner Dennis, as well as my wife, Dr. Tinna Nikolaevna Stoyanova, urged me to publish this collection of papers, I thought this would be an opportunity of repeating the experience of my first book, this time, however, as a single author. I have received further encouragement from my life-long friend Rafael González Rodríguez – no relation to the other two González mentioned above - and my former students Carlos Tirado Negrón and Pedro Rosario Barbosa, with the three of which I have discussed some of the issues in the papers. As always, I have benefited from the technical help of my friend Dr. Joel Donato, Director of the LABCAD at the library of the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras, and of my wife, Dr. Tinna Nikolaevna Stoyanova. To all of them I am especially grateful for their encouragement and for their friendship.

Finally, I have to thank Roberto Poli, who has been interested in my work for a long time and has been of much help in many occasions. We have never met, but have been in contact for some fifteen years. In the present case, Roberto Poli has accepted that this book be published in his collection "Categories" in Ontos Verlag. To

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Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock

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(4) ‘Husserl’s Philosophy of Mathematics: its Origin and Relevance’, *Husserl Studies* 22, 2006, pp. 193-222

(5) ‘Husserl on Analyticity and Beyond’, *Husserl Studies* 24, 2008, pp. 131-140

(6) ‘Platonism, Phenomenology and Interderivability’, in Mirja Hartimo (ed.), *Phenomenology and Mathematics*, Springer 2010, pp. 23-46

(II) Manuscripto

(1) ‘On the Semantics of Mathematical Statements’, *Manuscripto* XIX (1), 1996, pp. 149-175

(2) ‘The Structure of Husserl’s Prolegomena’, *Manuscripto* XXIII (2), 2000, pp. 61-99

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(1) ‘Issues in the Philosophy of Logic: an Heterodox Approach’, *Principia* 11 (1), 2007, pp. 25-44

(IV) Journals Permissions/ Oxford University Press

(1) ‘Why and How Platonism?’, *Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logic* 15, 2007, pp. 621-636

(V) Philosophiques

(1) English version of ‘Husserl pour le philosophes analytiques’, *Philosophiques* 37 (2), 2010, pp. 325-348

(VI) Anuario Colombiano de Fenomenología

(1) English version of ‘Husserl y Frege sobre los números propios e indexicales’, *Anuario Colombiano de Fenomenología* IV, 2010, pp. 275-294

(VII) Diálogos

(1) ‘On Necessity and Existence’, *Diálogos* 68, 1996, pp. 57-62

Introduction

If I were to characterize my philosophical views, I would be inclined to use an expression like “critical rationalism”, but since Popper has already used it to characterize his views, I opt not to do it. I am certainly not a Popperian, though Popper and Duhem, are, after Husserl and Frege, the contemporary philosophers I most value. Of course, in my early youth I was strongly influenced by Kant, whose *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* I devoured when I was still a teenager. Still in Puerto Rico I became interested in Husserl, Whitehead and Carnap. In my first semester in Germany I became acquainted with Frege and in my second semester with Tarski’s extraordinary monograph ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’. I later studied Popper and Reichenbach, and only much later Duhem. I could very well say that all those mentioned above exerted in one sense or another a non-negligible influence in my development, Kant playing the foundational role, though Husserl, Frege and Tarski had the most significant concrete influence, in the latter case, however, only his approach to logic, certainly not his empiricist leanings.

Although I do not neglect the importance of experience in the non-formal sciences, I am conscious that the role of experience in the most developed non-formal science, namely, physics is certainly much less than that of theorizing. That was the main reason why the logical-positivist program was doomed to failure from the very beginning. They should have read Duhem more carefully, since as he has pointed out, in physics theorizing and interpreting is already present in the design and “reading” of experiments. Physical science is theoretical from top to bottom. More basically, contrary to empiricist myths, as Husserl – and following him the young Carnap of *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* – has pointed out, we have no direct acquaintance with sense data or sensations, but with already constituted objects and states of affairs. Moreover, as Husserl stressed in the Sixth Logical Investigation, in the case of states of affairs, there are already present categorial components, that is, components that have no correlate in sense perception. We see the black briefcase on the brown

table, and only later can we detach the black colour of the briefcase or the brown one of the table. We see Peter and John at the door, not Peter and John separately. Much less do we see the red colour of John's shirt, the black one of his pants and the brown colour of his face and then combine them, and then go on to build Peter from the different sense data of his face, pants and shirt to combine them into a person, and then bring both together to have the experience of Peter and John being at the door. That is empiricist mythology.

The situation for empiricism and his cognate nominalism is even worse in logic and mathematics. As I have argued in some of my papers, there is no acceptable alternative to Platonism. It should be clear at least since Gödel's incompleteness results that even a mild formalism like Hilbert's is incapable of explaining the nature of mathematics. Constructivisms are of a wide variety, but even the most liberal Brouwerian constructivism, or intuitionism, cannot do justice even to the mathematics needed in physical science. Nominalism and conventionalism are, as I have argued in some of the papers, non-starters in the philosophy of mathematics. But even a mild realism like that advocated by the proponents of the indispensability argument faces insurmountable difficulties. Only a version of Platonism, namely, structural Platonism, like Husserl's, plus his semantics, does justice to the nature of mathematics. Since Husserl was not a logicist, his mathematical Platonism does not require the introduction of so-called logical objects, like Frege's courses of values. But though logic, expounded as a formal system, is not ontologically loaded, as soon as you consider its semantics things change. Classical model theory, that is, the semantics of first-order logic, is committed to Platonism, since it talks about mathematical structures of varying degrees of complexity with universes of all sorts of cardinalities. In this sense, there is no essential difference in ontological commitment between first- and second-order logic. Second-order logic simply quantifies over the structures already acknowledged by first-order logic. Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is only an attempt to mask the commitments of first-order logic, a sort of hypocritical anti-Platonism.

A word of caution should be said here in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. Although I do not agree with the

empiricist tendencies in present analytic philosophy – I reject much more vehemently English ordinary language philosophy -, I certainly value the work of Russell, the logical empiricists, especially Carnap, Reichenbach and Hempel, as well as that of Quine, Kripke and others. I have a similar opinion of Quine's views as of those of Hume: I am convinced that they are mostly completely wrong, but it is extremely difficult to show it. As I already mentioned, I studied Carnap and Reichenbach very seriously in my youth, and have always had personal sympathy for them and for the rigour of their philosophical analyses. It was not emotionally easy for me to show that the young Carnap had obtained many insights from his teacher Husserl and had tried to mask them. Moreover, though he was eager to mention that he attended some of Frege's lecture courses in Jena, he even never publicly acknowledged having been Husserl's post-doctoral student in three seminars from 1924 to 1925, though, as anyone who has studied in Germany knows, there is by far more contact with a professor in a seminar than in the lectures – and especially if you are already a doctor. Moreover, it was from Husserl that Carnap obtained many of his philosophical views in *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, not from Frege – and certainly not from Wittgenstein or from the Neo-Kantians – as others would like us to believe.

Let us now say a few words about the seventeen papers assembled in the present collection. It is my hope that these papers can contribute at least a little to the enhancement of rigorous philosophy.

The present collection of papers extends over a period of some thirty years. As already mentioned in the Preface, it consists of seventeen papers, three of them published here for the first time, divided into two groups. Although I have published many more papers and somewhat lengthy critical studies during that long period, I opted first to exclude all eight papers included in my joint book with Claire Ortiz Hill, *Husserl or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity and Mathematics* (Open Court 2000, 2003), as well as all critical studies, commentaries and expository papers. Thus, the first group of papers here included is concerned with the interpretation of some recent philosophers, most notably Husserl, but also Frege, Carnap and Kripke, though they are certainly not mere expositions, but sometimes very critical analyses of